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Abstract—A common approach for introducing security at the
physical layer is to rely on the channel variations of the wireless
environment. This type of approach is not always suitable for
wireless networks where the channel remains static for most of
the network lifetime. For these scenarios, a channel independent
physical layer security measure is more appropriate which will
rely on a secret known to the sender and the receiver but
not to the eavesdropper. In this paper, we propose CD-PHY,
a physical layer security technique that exploits the constellation
diversity of wireless networks which is independent of the
channel variations. The sender and the receiver use a custom
bit sequence to constellation symbol mapping to secure the
physical layer communication which is not known a priori to the
eavesdropper. Through theoretical modeling and experimental
simulation, we show that this information theoretic construct
can achieve Shannon secrecy and any brute force attack from
the eavesdropper incurs high overhead and minuscule probability
of success. Our results also show that the high bit error rate also
makes decoding practically infeasible for the eavesdropper, thus
securing the communication between the sender and receiver.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless networks, physical (PHY) layer security enables
nodes to communicate securely without using resource in-
tensive encryption mechanisms at the application layer. PHY
layer security measures are resource friendly due to their
information theoretic construct based on perfect secrecy [1]
in contrast with the computational hardness approaches [2].
By introducing security at the PHY layer, communication
in wireless networks can avoid the stepping stone of most
attacks: eavesdropping. In general, the broadcast nature of the
the communication makes wireless networks more vulnerable
to eavesdropping attacks than the wired counterpart. PHY
layer security measures are able thwart such attacks to a
considerable extent [3], [4].
Most of the existing PHY layer security schemes are based
on the variation of channel characteristics [5], [6], [7]. How-
ever, without highly mobile or dynamic environment which
can introduce significant variation in channel characteristics,
these schemes do not perform as expected [8]. Experimental
results show that in static scenarios, these scheme mostly
provide keys with very low entropy which is not desired in
many cases [6]. In this paper, we propose a PHY layer security
technique, CD-PHY, based on constellation diversity, which is
not dependent on channel characteristics and the performance
does not vary depending on static or mobile scenario.
The underlying technique for CD-PHY is simple. At the
physical layer, the sender and the intended receiver uses a
custom constellation mapping [9] which acts as a secret key
to secure the communication from an eavesdropper. In other
words, a sequence of bits from the sender is converted into
symbols on the constellation space based on a mapping known
only to the sender and the intended receiver. Using the correct
mapping, the intended receiver will be able to decode the
signal and reconstruct the original message. However, the
eavesdropper will not even be able to decode the signal
correctly without the knowledge of constellation mapping, let
alone reconstruction of the message.
The guarantee of security provided by CD-PHY is much
stronger than just keeping the modulation type (BPSK, QPSK,
and QAM1, for example) a secret between the sender and the
receiver. Because, if the sender and receiver uses the standard
constellation mapping for these modulations, an eavesdropper
can use advanced machine learning techniques [11], [12]
to identify the modulation type and then use the standard
mapping to decode the signal. In case of CD-PHY, the custom
constellation mapping is known only to the sender and the
receiver which is the basis of security for this information
theoretic construct.
Our theoretical modelling, security analysis and experimen-
tal simulation reveals the following about CD-PHY:
• For the eavesdropper, the probability of successfully
decode the symbols range from 10−3 at 10dB SNR2 to
0.015 at 0dB SNR, which is very low (Section IV),
• CD-PHY achieves perfect secrecy as a cipher and has
a very high unicity distance which ensures that the
eavesdropper will not be able to find the correct decoding
regardless of the amount of ciphertexts it collects (Sec-
tion V-A),
• A brute-force key search attack on CD-PHY has complex-
ity #P (Sharp P)3 which is believed to be much harder
than polynomial time algorithms (Section V-B), and
• Performance wise, in the presence of CD-PHY, regardless
of the location, the bit error rate at the eavesdropper is
always as high as 50% which is equivalent to random
guessing for the decoding purposes (Section VI).
II. BACKGROUND AND OBSERVATIONS
At the physical layer, a modulation technique prepares the
digital bit sequences for transmission over the analog wireless
medium. A crucial part of this operation is to map the bit
1BPSK and QPSK refers to Binary and Quadrature Phase Shift Keying,
respectively. QAM refers to Quadrature Amplitude Modulation. An overview
of modulation schemes by Zeimer can be found at [10].
2Signal-to-noise ratio.
3The set of the counting problems associated with the decision problems
in the set NP.
2sequences to symbols which can be represented as points
on a two dimensional complex plane called the constellation
diagram. Figure 1 shows an example constellation diagram
from 16-ary Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (16QAM cir-
cular). An alternate constellation diagram is shown in Figure
2 which is known as 16QAM rectangular. If the transmitter
wishes to send a bit sequence, it sets the real (x-axis) and
imaginary (y-axis) part according to the constellation diagram.
Mathematically, a signal can be expressed by the following
equation:
s(t) = I(t).cos(2pifot) +Q(t).sin(2pifot)
where I(t) and Q(t) are real and imaginary parts of the symbols
from the constellation diagram and fo is the modulating
frequency. The receiver recovers the real and imaginary values
after demodulation, and plots each symbol on the constellation
plane. To correctly decode the original message, the receiver
needs to know both the type of modulation as well as symbol
to bit sequence mapping4.
When only the modulation type is the secret, the eavesdrop-
per can use machine learning based techniques [11], [12] to
identify the modulation type and use standard bit sequence to
symbol mapping to decode the data. However, if the sender
and receiver use a custom constellation mapping which is not
known to the eavesdropper, the complexity of correct decoding
becomes very high. For an M-ary QAM, the eavesdropper has
to try all M ! mappings to find out the correct decoding, which
is very impractical for scenarios when the value of M ≥ 8.
Figure 3 shows the decoding failure when the eavesdrop-
per tries to decode an original 16QAM circular modulated
signal using different modulation types: BPSK, QPSK and
16QAM rectangular. The input data stream contained 8 bits,
01100101. In 16QAM, each symbol consists of 4 bits. So,
two symbols will be received by the eavesdropper. The QPSK
receiver decodes two symbols as 4 bits and the BPSK receiver
decodes it to 2 bits. Since the modulation classification was
wrong, obviously the mapping will also be wrong resulting
to a decoding failure. In the case of 16QAM rectangular,
the receiver will correctly expand the symbols to 8 bits.
However, since the constellation mapping was different5, the
final decoded data will be different from the input: 11110111.
Another decoding failure, where the original symbols belonged
to 16QAM rectangular, is shown in Figure 4.
The intuitive design of CD-PHY is based on the above
mentioned observations that without knowing the correct
constellation mapping, it is not practically feasible for an
eavesdropper to correctly decode the original message even
though it might have the knowledge of modulation type.
III. ADVERSARIAL MODEL
We assume that the adversary (eavesdropper) is able to
detect and will try to decode the communication between
the sender and receiver. It can be either mobile or static.
4Constellation mapping.
5Refers to Figure 1 and 2.
An adversary can also measure the channel parameters. It
can exploit some machine learning techniques to identify the
modulation type of the wireless communication, but it does not
have prior knowledge of the constellation mapping between
the sender and intended receiver.
We also assume the eavesdropper’s computation and com-
munication capability as powerful as the sender and receiver.
The adversary can try to handle the original signal as noise
or try interference cancellation and joint decoding. Finally, we
assume that the adversary is passive and has no intention to
launch active attacks such as a man-in-the-middle attack. This
is a common assumption among most of the practical wireless
security schemes [8].
IV. THEORETICAL MODELLING
In this section, we derive the probability of an eavesdropper
to correctly decode the message in the presence of gaussian
noise when it knows the modulation type but does not know
the constellation mapping. A very intuitive example of this
case is the interaction between 16QAM circular and rectangu-
lar modulations discussed in Section II. We use this example
to derive the probability measure of correct decoding when
the sender modulation is 16QAM circular and eavesdropper
modulation is 16QAM rectangular.
As discussed in Section II, each QAM symbol has a real
and imaginary value associated with it in the constellation
space. Mathematically, for an M-ary QAM, these real and
imaginary values can range ±a, . . . ,±(2m − 1)a, where
m = log2M , a
2 = 1.5Es/(M −1) with Es being the symbol
energy [13]. Table I shows the bit sequence to constellation
symbol mapping in 16QAM circular and 16QAM rectangular
Scheme These values are further factored by a =
√
Es/10 to
normalize the average symbol energy to 1.
The decision variable for demodulation in the presence of
additive white gaussian noise can be obtained as
Y ≈ X + n (1)
where the noise term n(t) is assumed with power spectral
density No2 , zero mean and variance of σ
2 = No. Thus, the
decision variable Y is a complex gaussian with a complex
mean X and variance σ2 = No. In other words, Y has a two
dimensional gaussian distribution in complex plane. So, the
real and imaginary parts of Y can be separated as independent
gaussian variables as YR and YI with means at Re(X) and
Im(X).
YR = Re(Y ) = Re(X) + nR = XR + nR
YI = Im(Y ) = Im(X) + nI = XI + nI
where nR and nI are the components of noise along real and
imaginary axes with a mean zero and variance σ2R = σ2I = No2 .
Now, the probability density function of YR can be expressed
as:
f(YR) =
1√
2piσ2R
exp− { (YR −XR)
2
2σ2R
}
=
1√
piNo
exp− { (YR −XR)
2
No
} (2)
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Fig. 1. 16QAM Circular Constellation
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Fig. 3. Decoding failure when the original modulation is 16QAM circular. Fig. 4. Decoding failure when the original modulation is 16QAM rectangular.
Similarly, the probability density function of YI can also be
expressed as:
f(YI) =
1√
piNo
exp− { (YI −XI)
2
No
} (3)
Now, to calculate the probability of the successful decoding
at the eavesdropper with 16QAM rectangular scheme when
the original symbols were transmitted in 16QAM circular
scheme, we first need to consider the probabilities at individual
symbol level. These probabilities are then aggregated using
the symmetry and mutual independence of the symbols. In
the following derivations, Sri denotes a symbol Si in 16QAM
rectangular scheme, Sci represents a symbol Si in 16QAM
circular scheme and four symbols are chosen from the constel-
lation diagram in such a way that symmetrically they represent
all sixteen points of a QAM scheme.
A. Decoding of symbol 0000
First, we consider Sc0 = 0000 being transmitted. From Table
I, the real and imaginary parts of 0000 are
XR = 1.53
√
Es
10
& XI = −3.69
√
Es
10
The received symbol Y has a complex gaussian distribution
as discussed earlier with the mean at XR + jXI . Now, the
probability that the symbol Y can be correctly decoded by
the eavesdropper using 16QAM rectangular decoder can be
found based on the decision space for Sr0 = 0000 in 16QAM
rectangular scheme. Formally, the probability that decoded
symbol is Sr0 given Sc0 was transmitted is:
P (Y = Sr0 |Sc0) =
P
(
−∞ < YR < −2
√
Es
10
)
P
(
2
√
Es
10 < YI <∞
)
P (Y = Sr0 |Sc0) =
∫ −2√Es
10
−∞
f(YR)dYR ×
∫ ∞
2
√
Es
10
f(YI)dYI
4TABLE I
BIT SEQUENCE TO CONSTELLATION SYMBOL MAPPING IN 16QAM CIRCULAR AND 16QAM RECTANGULAR SCHEME
Bit Sequence 16QAM Circular 16QAM Rectangular Bit Sequence 16QAM Circular 16QAM Rectangular
0000 1.53− 3.69j −3 + 3j 1000 1.53 + 3.69j −3− 3j
0001 .76− 1.84j −1 + 3j 1001 .76 + 1.84j −1− 3j
0010 −1.53 + 3.69j 3 + 3j 1010 −1.53− 3.69j 3− 3j
0011 −.76 + 1.84j 1 + 3j 1011 −.76− 1.84j 1− 3j
0100 3.69− 1.53j −3 + j 1100 3.69 + 1.53j −3− j
0101 1.84− .76j −1 + j 1101 1.84 + .76j −1− j
0110 −3.69 + 1.53j 3 + j 1110 −3.69− 1.53j 3− j
0111 −1.84 + .76j 1 + j 1111 −1.84− .76j 1− j
P (Y = Sr0 |Sc0) =
1√
piNo
∫ −2√Es
10
−∞ exp− {
(YR−1.53
√
Es
10
)2
No
}dYR
× 1√
piNo
∫∞
2
√
Es
10
exp− { (YI−(−3.69
√
Es
10
))2
No
}dYI
Using the simplification of above integrals,
P (Y = Sr0 |Sc0) =
1√
pi
∫ ∞
3.53
√
Es
10No
exp{−t2}dt
× 1√
pi
∫ ∞
5.69
√
Es
10No
exp{−z2}dz
P (Y = Sr0 |Sc0)
= 12erfc
(
3.53
√
Es
10No
)
1
2erfc
(
5.69
√
Es
10No
)
= 14erfc
(
3.53
√
Es
10No
)
erfc
(
5.69
√
Es
10No
)
(4)
Here, erfc() is the complementary error function.
B. Decoding of symbol 0100
Now, we consider the symbol Sc1 = 0100 being transmitted.
Similar to the previous example,
XR = 3.69
√
Es
10
& XI = −1.53
√
Es
10
So, the probability that the eavesdropper correctly decodes the
symbol 0100 is:
P (Y = Sr1 |Sc1) =
P
(
−∞ < YR < −2
√
Es
10
)
P
(
0 < YI < 2
√
Es
10
)
(5)
Now, the left part of the right hand side of Equation 5 gives
us the following:
P
(
−∞ < YR < −2
√
Es
10
)
= 1√
piNo
∫ −2√Es
10
−∞ exp−{
(YR−3.69
√
Es
10
)2
N0
}dYR
= 12erfc
(
5.69
√
Es
10No
)
(6)
Next, the right part yields the following:
P
(
0 < YI < 2
√
Es
10
)
= 1− P
(
YI < 0, YI > 2
√
Es
10
)
P
(
0 < YI < 2
√
Es
10
)
= 1−
[ 1√
piNo
∫ 0
−∞exp−{
(YI−(−1.53
√
Es
10
)))2
No
}dYI
+ 1√
piNo
∫∞
2
√
Es
10
exp−{ (YI−(−1.53
√
Es
10
)))2
No
}dYI ]
P
(
0 < YI < 2
√
Es
10
)
= 1− 12erfc
(
1.53
√
Es
10No
)
− 12erfc
(
3.53
√
Es
10No
) (7)
Using Equation 6,7 on Equation 5, we have the following:
P (Y = Sr1 |Sc1) = 12erfc
(
5.69
√
Es
10No
)
×[
1− 12erfc
(
1.53
√
Es
10No
)
− 12erfc
(
3.53
√
Es
10No
)]
P (Y = Sr1 |Sc1) = 12erfc
(
5.69
√
Es
10No
)
− 14erfc
(
5.69
√
Es
10No
)
erfc
(
1.53
√
Es
10No
)
− 14erfc
(
5.69
√
Es
10No
)
erfc
(
3.53
√
Es
10No
)
)
(8)
C. Decoding of symbol 0101
Now, we consider, Sc2 = 0101 is being transmitted. In this
case:
XR = 1.84
√
Es
10
& XI = −0.76
√
Es
10
So, the probability that the eavesdropper correctly decodes the
symbol is:
P (Y = Sr2 |Sc2) =
P
(
−2
√
Es
10 < YR < 0
)
P
(
0 < YI < 2
√
Es
10
)
(9)
We first consider the left part of the right hand side of Equation
9:
P
(
−2
√
Es
10 < YR < 0
)
= 1− P
(
YR > 0, YR < −2
√
Es
10
)
P
(
−2
√
Es
10 < YR < 0
)
= 1−
[ 1√
piNo
∫∞
0 exp−{
(YR−1.84
√
Es
10
)2
No
}dYR ×
1√
piNo
∫ −2√Es
10
−∞ exp− {
(YR−1.84
√
Es
10
)2
No
}dYR]
5P
(
−2
√
Es
10 < YR < 0
)
= 1−
1
2erfc
(
3.84
√
Es
10No
)
− 12erfc
(
−1.84
√
Es
10No
)
(10)
Similarly, we consider the right part of the right hand side of
Equation 9:
P
(
0 < YI < 2
√
Es
10
)
= 1− P
(
YI < 0, YI > 2
√
Es
10
)
P
(
0 < YI < 2
√
Es
10
)
= 1−
[ 1√
piNo
∫ 0
−∞exp−{
(YI−(−0.76
√
Es
10
))2
No
}dYI
+ 1√
piNo
∫∞
2
√
Es
10
exp−{ (YI−(−0.76
√
Es
10
))2
N1
}dYI ]
P
(
0 < YI < 2
√
Es
10
)
= 1− 12erfc
(
−0.76
√
Es
10No
)
− 12erfc
(
2.76
√
Es
10No
) (11)
Thus, combining Equation 10, 11, we have:
P (Y = Sr2 |c2) =[
1− 12erfc
(
3.84
√
Es
10No
)
− 12erfc
(
−1.84
√
Es
10No
)]
×
[
1− 12erfc
(
−0.76
√
Es
10No
)
− 12erfc
(
2.76
√
Es
10No
)]
(12)
D. Decoding of symbol 0001
Finally, we consider symbol Sc3 = 0001 being transmitted.
In this case:
XR=0.76
√
Es
10
& XI=−1.84
√
Es
10
So, the probability that eavesdropper correctly decodes symbol
0001 is:
P (Y =Sr3 |Sc3)=P
(
−2
√
Es
10<YR < 0
)
P
(
2
√
Es
10 <YI<∞
)
(13)
Considering the left part of the right hand side of Equation
13:
P
(
−2
√
Es
10 <YR<0
)
=1−P
(
YR<−2
√
Es
10 , YR>0
)
P
(
−2
√
Es
10 <YR<0
)
= 1 −
[ 1√
piNo
∫ −2√Es
10
−∞ exp−{
(YR−0.76
√
Es
10
)2
No
}dYR
+ 1√
piNo
∫∞
0 exp−{
(YR−0.76
√
Es
10
)2
No
}dYR]
P
(
−2
√
Es
10 <YR<0
)
=1− 12erfc
(
2.76
√
Es
10No
)
− 12erfc
(
−0.76
√
Es
10No
) (14)
Similarly, the right part yields:
P
(
2
√
Es
10 <YI<∞
)
=
1√
piNo
∫∞
2
√
Es
10
exp−{(YI−(−1.84
√
Es
10
))2
No
}dYI
P
(
2
√
Es
10 <YI<∞
)
= 12erfc
(
3.84
√
Es
10No
)
(15)
By combining the outcomes of Equation 14, 15, we get the
following:
P (Y = Sr3 |Sc3) = 12erfc
(
3.84
√
Es
10No
)
− 14erfc
(
3.84
√
Es
10No
)
erfc
(
2.76
√
Es
10No
)
− 14erfc
(
3.84
√
Es
10No
)
erfc
(
−0.76
√
Es
10No
)
(16)
As mentioned earlier, based on the symmetry of QAM con-
stellation diagrams, other symbols will also have probabilities
equal to one of the following symbols: S0, S1, S2 or S3. As-
suming all symbols have equal probability of being generated
and transmitted i.e. P (Sk) = 1/16 where (k = 0 . . . 15), the
total probability P (C) that the data transmitted by 16QAM
circular transmitter and correctly decoded by 16QAM rectan-
gular eavesdropper is:
P (C) = P (Sk)× 4× [P (Y = Sr0 |Sc0) + P (Y = Sr1 |Sc1)
+P (Y = Sr2 |Sc2) + P (Y = Sr3 |Sc3)]
P (C) =
1
4
[−1
4
erfc
(
5.69
√
Es
10No
)
erfc
(
1.53
√
Es
10No
)
+
1
4
erfc
(
−1.84
√
Es
10No
)
erfc
(
2.76
√
Es
10No
)
+
1
4
erfc
(
−1.84
√
Es
10No
)
erfc
(
−0.76
√
Es
10No
)
−1
2
erfc
(
−0.76
√
Es
10No
)
− 1
2
erfc
(
2.76
√
Es
10No
)
+
1
2
erfc
(
5.69
√
Es
10No
)
− 1
2
erfc
(
−1.84
√
Es
10No
)
+1]
(17)
Here, No is the power spectral density of the noise and Es
is the symbol energy of the signal. So, the term Es/No is a
representative of the SNR at the receiver. Since Equation 17
contains erfc() function, as we increase the value of SNR
in the erfc() function, the probability will decrease. So, the
probability of correct decoding is adversely affected by the
SNR of the wireless medium at receivers. This theoretical
fact is illustrated further in Figure 5. The line with circles
refers to the probability of correct decoding and the line
with crosses refers to the probability of error. At 0dB SNR,
the probability of error for the eavesdropper is 0.002. At
SNR values above 20dB, the probability of error is nearly
1 which makes the decoding almost infeasible in practice. In
comparison, for an intended receiver with 16QAM circular
scheme, the probability of error at 0dB SNR is around 1, and
0 for a SNR of 20dB [13].
60 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
0.014
0.016
SNR(dB)
PR
O
BA
BI
LI
TY
 O
F 
CO
RR
EC
T 
DE
CO
DI
NG
0.984
0.986
0.988
0.99
0.992
0.994
0.996
0.998
1
PR
O
BA
BI
LI
TY
 O
F 
ER
RO
R
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V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze CD-PHY in terms of information
theoretic security, security by complexity and resistance to
potential modulation classification schemes such as Automatic
Modulation Classification (AMC) [12] and Digital Modulation
Classification (DMC) [11].
The basis of information theoretic security is the fact that
the bit sequence to constellation symbol mapping is known
only to the sender and receiver(s). The eavesdropper does not
have any a prior knowledge of the mapping. In the subsequent
section, by applying Shannon’s secrecy model (Figure 6) to
CD-PHY, we show that it can in deed achieve information
theoretic security. In addition, any decoding attempt on the
eavesdropper side incurs high complexity as it blindly tries to
find the mapping. Finally, we show how CD-PHY thwarts the
classification attempts by AMC and DMC.
A. Information theoretic security
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Fig. 6. Shannon’s Secrecy Model
In CD-PHY, the act of finding the correct mapping from the
constellation points to bit sequences is essentially a decipher-
ing operation for the eavesdropper. Here, the transmitted bit
sequences are plaintext P , signal received by the eavesdropper
is the ciphertext C, the mapping is the key K . For an
M-ary QAM, the plaintext can have M symbols, each of
which are log2M bits. The key, mapping of bit sequences to
constellation points, has M ! variations. Now, we define perfect
secrecy and unicity distance which is due to Shannon [1].
Definition 1. A cipher achieves perfect secrecy, if without
knowing the secret key, the plaintext P is independent of the
ciphertext C, formally:
prob(P = P |C = EK(P )) = prob(P = P ) (18)
Equivalently,
prob(C = C|P = E−1K (C)) = prob(C = C) (19)
P1
P2
Pn
C1
C2
Cn
Ka
......
Kb
Fig. 7. An illustration of plaintext to ciphertext mapping.
Definition 2. Unicity distance of a cipher is the minimum
amount of ciphertext needed for brute-force attack to succeed.
Formally:
U = H(K)/D (20)
where H(K) is the entropy is the key and D is the redundancy
of the message.
Definition 1 leads us to the following theorem:
Theorem 1. CD-PHY achieves perfect secrecy.
Proof: Perfect secrecy requires that without the knowl-
edge of the key, each ciphertext is equally probably to map
to any plaintext of that domain. Since the symbols are inde-
pendent of each other and equally probable to map any of the
constellation points, for an M-ary QAM scheme, we have the
following:
prob(C = C|P = E−1K (C)) = 1/M = prob(C = C) (21)
which meets the requirements of perfect secrecy. In other
words, since the key K is independent of plaintext P and
follows uniform distribution, it leads us to:
prob(P = P |C = EK(P )) = 1/M = prob(P = P ) (22)
7More rigorously:prob(P = P |C = C)
=
prob(P = P,C = C)
prob(C = C)
=
prob(C = C|P = P )prob(P = P )∑
P ′∈P
prob(C = C|P = P ′)prob(P = P ′)
=
prob(K = C → P )prob(P = P )∑
P ′∈P
prob(K = C → P ′)prob(P = P ′)
=
1
M
prob(P = P )∑
P ′∈P
1
M
prob(P = P ′)
= prob(P = P ) (23)
where K=C→P refers that key K is a mapping between
plaintext P and ciphertext C.
In addition, according to perfect cipher keyspace theo-
rem [1] 6, if a cipher is perfect, there must be at least as
many keys (l) are there are possible messages (n). This leads
us to the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Messages in CD-PHY with M-ary QAM scheme
should contain less than n symbols such that M ! ≥ Mn to
maintain perfect secrecy.
Definition 2 leads us to the following theorem:
Theorem 2. The unicity distance of CD-PHY tends to infinity.
Proof: For a CD-PHY with M-ary QAM, entropy of the
key H(K) ≈ logM !. Since, the symbols are independent of
each other, the redundancy D = 0 for the message. So, the
unicity distance is U ≈ (logM !/0) =∞.
Unicity distance is a theoretical measure of how many
ciphertexts are required to determine a unique plaintext. If
one has less than unicity distance ciphertext, it is not possible
to identify if the deciphering is correct. In fact, when the
redundancy approaches to zero, it is hard to attack even simple
cipher. For CD-PHY, a unicity distance of infinity means
that the eavesdropper won’t be able to determine whether
the deciphering is correct regardless of the number of the
ciphertexts it has in its possession. This is, in fact, a very
strong information theoretic guarantee of CD-PHY security.
B. Security by complexity
Now, we model the problem of brute-force key search
attack7 on CD-PHY as a complete bipartite graph perfect
matching problem and analyze the algorithmic complexity of
it.
Definition 3. A complete bipartite graph is a bipartite graph
where every vertex of the one set is connected to each vertex
of the other set. Formally, a complete bipartite graph, G =
(V1∪V2, E), is a bipartite graph such that for any two vertices,
v1 ∈ V1 and v2 ∈ V 2, v1v2 is an edge in G.
6Also known as Shannon bound.
7Finding the bit sequence to constellation point mapping.
From the definition of a complete bipartite graph [14], it is
straightforward to see the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The bit sequence to constellation point mapping
in CD-PHY is a complete bipartite graph.
Proof: A complete bipartite graph partitions the vertices
into two sets |V1| = p and |V2| = q. Now, we can see from
Figure 7 that each plaintext (bit sequence) on the left side of
the graph can be considered a vertex of V1 and each ciphertext
(constellation points) on the right can be considered a vertex
of V2. Based on the key, it is possible to map every member
of V1 to any member of V2. Thus, it constitutes a complete
bipartite graph where |V1| = |V2| = log2M for an M-ary
QAM scheme.
Now, to explain perfect matching [15] of the complete
bipartite graph, we need the following definition.
Definition 4. A matching in a graph is a set of edges without
common vertices. In a perfect matching, every vertex of the
graph is connected to only one edge of the matching.
The counting version of complete bipartite graph perfect
matching problem returns the total number of perfect matching
where each edge in the matching connects two unique vertices
from V1 and V2. Theorem 3 and Definition 4 leads us to the
following theorem:
Theorem 4. The brute-force key search attack on CD-PHY is:
1) equivalent to counting version of complete bipartite
graph perfect matching problem, and
2) in complexity class #P (Sharp P) complete.
Proof: Based on Theorem 3 and Defintion 4, proof of
part 1 is trivial. The problem of counting the number of
perfect matching of a complete bipartite graph can be solved
by computing the permanent of the bi-adjacency matrix [16]
of the graph. The permanent of a matrix A = n×n is defined
as:
perm(A) =
∑
σ
n∏
1
ai,σ(i) (24)
where σ is a permutation over {1, 2, . . . , n} . The complexity
of computing permanent of a matrix is in complexity class
#P complete, as proved by the seminal work [17] of Valiant
in 1979.
In general, computing the permanent of a matrix is believed
to be harder than its determinant. While one can compute the
determinant in polynomial time by Gaussian elimination, the
same cannot be used to compute the permanent. Thus, the
computational complexity of the brute-force key search attack
on CD-PHY also adds to the security of the scheme.
C. Defense against modulation classification schemes
The section explains where does CD-PHY stand when the
eavesdropper tries to apply some modulation classification
techniques such as AMC [12] and DMC [11].
AMC is based on cyclic feature detection technique consid-
ering the cyclostationary property of the modulated signals.
8It considers the fact that modulated signals in practice have
parameters that vary periodically with time. These hidden
periodicities are used to classify the modulation techniques.
Although, AMC is able to differentiate modulations such as
BPSK, QPSK, and QAM based on large amount of training
data and supervised learning, it can not identify the shape
of the constellation and constellation mapping of symbols
to constellation points. Also, for higher order QAM, the
complexity of AMC makes it practically infeasible even to
classify the modulation.
DMC uses constellation shape as the basis of modulation
classification. In this algorithm, the receiver constructs a
scatter diagram of the received noisy symbols in a complex
plane and uses fuzzy c-means clustering to recover robust con-
stellation. The modulation type is identified using maximum
likelihood (ML) classification with predefined constellation
templates. Similar to AMC, digital modulation classification
also requires a large amount of training data and supervised
learning to identify templates. Thus, although it can identify
pre-defined constellation shapes, it is not able to identify
constellation mapping from symbols to constellation points.
In summary, CD-PHY can withstand existing modulation
classification techniques and secure against the attacks exploit-
ing such techniques in practice.
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Fig. 14. Simulated wireless network scenario. The sender uses 16QAM
circular scheme. At different distances, each group has an intended receiver
with 16QAM circular scheme and three eavesdroppers each with 16QAM
rectangular, QPSK and BPSK scheme.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND SIMULATION
RESULTS
In this section, we show the impact of CD-PHY on the
network performance of the eavesdropper. A very intuitive
measure of such performance evaluation is to show how many
bits are received in error at different signal and noise power.
Typically, when the signal power increases, the receiver is able
to decode the bits more accurately leading to a lower bit error
rate (BER). In the following experiment, we show that the
BER of CD-PHY receiver conforms to this pattern whereas the
BER of the eavesdroppers does not decrease even for higher
signal power.
The experimental scenario is shown in Figure 14. We
designate a CD-PHY sender with 16QAM circular modulation
scheme. The receivers are divided into three groups based on
their distances from the sender. Group 1, group2 and group
3 are at 10m, 50m and 100m distance, respectively. Each
group has an intended CD-PHY receiver with 16QAM circular
scheme and three eavesdroppers with 16QAM rectangular,
QPSK and BPSK scheme.
We measure the BER at different receivers for different
SNRs. Experimental scenarios contain both free space and
indoor environments. Figure 8, 9 and 10 show the measure-
ments from free space environment. For the CD-PHY receiver,
with the increment of SNR, the bit error rate decreases fol-
lowing the usual pattern of wireless communication. However,
for eavesdroppers with different schemes, the bit error rate
is more than 50% regradless of the increment of SNR. The
error rate is the highest in BPSK which is consistent with
our analysis in Section II. As the distance increases, BER of
BPSK scheme can go as high as 60%, resulting in a near to
impossible decoding process.
Figure 11, 12 and 13 show BER vs SNR for indoor envi-
ronment. The bit error rates of the eavesdroppers are also as
high as 50% throughout the measurements for different SNR
values. Similar to the free space environment, the distance of
the receivers also adversely affect the bit error rate.
Figure 15 aggregates the BER measurements for different
locations of the eavesdropper. The median BER is around 50%
and the range is 40% to 60%. It shows that in the presence of
CD-PHY, the eavesdroppers experience such a high bit error
rate that it is almost equivalent of randomly guessing the bits.
This is true for both indoor and free space environment and
ensures that the eavesdropper can not comprehend the signal
when CD-PHY is in action.
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Fig. 15. Eavesdropper bit error rate from indoor and free space experiments.
VII. CONCLUSION
CD-PHY is a simple mechanism that introduces channel
independent security at the physical layer of wireless com-
munication. We have shown that in the presence of CD-PHY,
the eavesdropper has a very low probability of successfully
decoding the signal. The scheme achieves Shannon secrecy as
a cipher and a brute-force key search attack on CD-PHY falls
under complexity class #P which is believed to be harder than
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Fig. 8. BER vs SNR for α = 2 and d = 10m
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Fig. 9. BER vs SNR for α = 2 and d = 50m
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Fig. 10. BER vs SNR for α = 2 and d = 100m
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
SNR(dB)−−>
BE
R
−−
>
 
 
16QAMc (Intended Receiver)
16QAMr (Eavesdropper1)
BPSK (Eavesdropper2)
QPSK (Eavesdropper3)
Fig. 11. BER vs SNR for α = 1.4 and d = 10m
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Fig. 12. BER vs SNR for α = 1.4 and d = 50m
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Fig. 13. BER vs SNR for α = 1.4 and d = 100m
polynomial time algorithms. Our experimental results confirm
the theoretical derivations; the bit error rate at the eavesdropper
is significantly high and it is practically infeasible to decode
the signal which ensures the communication secrecy between
the sender and the intended receiver.
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